The Presumption of Innocence under Jordanian Law: An Accused Person Is Innocent Until Proven Guilty by a Final Judgment
Introduction
The presumption of innocence is one of the most fundamental safeguards underpinning modern criminal justice systems.
It is not merely a procedural rule from which an accused person benefits during trial; rather, it is a constitutional principle that accompanies the individual from the moment suspicion arises, continues throughout the investigation and trial stages, and remains in force unless and until guilt is established in accordance with the law by a final and conclusive judicial judgment.
The Jordanian constitutional legislator has elevated this principle to the status of a constitutional guarantee, Article 101(4) of the Jordanian Constitution provides:
“An accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty by a final judgment.”
The Jordanian Code of Criminal Procedure likewise affirms this principle and directly connects it with the rules governing criminal evidence, the burden of proof, and judicial conviction.
Accordingly, an accused person is not required to prove his innocence; rather, it is incumbent upon the Public Prosecution to establish the commission of the offence and attribute it to the accused through lawful and convincing evidence capable of supporting a judgment of conviction.
The importance of the principle that “an accused person is innocent until proven guilty” therefore extends far beyond a theoretical proposition.
It produces significant legal consequences, foremost among them that the burden of proof rests upon the prosecuting authority, that doubt must be interpreted in favor of the accused, and that criminal convictions must be founded upon certainty and judicial conviction rather than suspicion, conjecture, or mere probability.
First: The Constitutional Basis of the Presumption of Innocence in Jordan
Article 101 of the Jordanian Constitution establishes a number of fundamental safeguards relating to the judiciary and criminal proceedings. Paragraph 4 thereof provides:
“An accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty by a final judgment.”
This concise provision embodies a constitutional safeguard of exceptional importance. The Constitution does not treat innocence merely as a possibility to be preferred where the evidence is weak; rather, it establishes innocence as the legal starting point from which the judicial system must proceed when dealing with an accused person.
Accordingly, a person does not become guilty merely because an accusation has been brought against him, because he has been detained, or because he has been referred to trial, Nor may he be treated, as a matter of law, as though he bears the burden of proving that he did not commit the offence.
Innocence is the rule; conviction is the exception and must be established by evidence.
The institution of criminal proceedings does not displace the presumption of innocence. Instead, it places upon the Public Prosecution the obligation to prove its case through lawful, sufficient, and persuasive evidence.
What Is Meant by the Phrase “By a Final Judgment”?
The wording of Article 101(4) of the Constitution is particularly significant because the constitutional legislator did not merely state that an accused person remains innocent until “a judgment of conviction is rendered.” Rather, it expressly requires that guilt be established “by a final judgment.”
This means that the presumption of innocence enjoys continuing protection and that the mere issuance of a first-instance judgment that remains subject to appeal should not be equated with a final and conclusive judgment that has exhausted the applicable avenues of challenge or has otherwise become immune from further appeal under the law.
Finality in this context relates to the legal conclusiveness and stability of the criminal judgment and to its no longer being subject to an avenue of appeal that prevents it from acquiring final status under the applicable law.
This interpretation reinforces the constitutional protection afforded to the accused and prevents an accusation, in and of itself, from prematurely becoming a legal or social conviction.
Second: The Presumption of Innocence Under the Jordanian Code of Criminal Procedure
The Jordanian legislator did not limit the protection of the presumption of innocence to the constitutional provision. Rather, it translated this constitutional guarantee into practical rules under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Article 147 provides, in substance, as follows:
The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty by a final judgment.
Evidence in felonies, misdemeanors, and contraventions may be established by all means of proof, and the judge shall adjudicate according to his personal conviction.
Where the law prescribes a particular method of proof, that method must be observed.
Where no evidence is established in respect of the alleged fact, the judge shall acquit the accused, defendant, or complainant against whom the offence has been alleged.
The structure of Article 147 is particularly significant because the legislator brings together, within a single provision, the presumption of innocence, the rules of evidence, judicial conviction, and acquittal where the evidence fails to establish the alleged facts.
This connection is logical. The presumption of innocence cannot fulfil its intended purpose unless it produces concrete consequences within the law of evidence.
If an accused person is presumed innocent, then the presumed legal position does not itself require proof. The party alleging the contrary bears the burden of establishing it.
Third: The Public Prosecution Bears the Burden of Proving Guilt
One of the most important consequences of the presumption of innocence is that the burden of proving the offence rests upon the Public Prosecution.
The legal starting point is innocence, and a person who benefits from that presumption is not required to prove it.
Accordingly, it is legally incorrect to require an accused person to “prove that he did not commit the offence.”
The proper question to be addressed to the prosecuting authority is:
What lawful evidence establishes that the accused committed the offence charged against him?
Depending on the nature of the case, the Public Prosecution must establish the elements necessary for criminal liability, including:
The occurrence of the criminal act;
Attribution of that act to the accused;
The existence of all legal elements constituting the offence;
The requisite mental element, where required by law;
The causal connection between the accused, the conduct, and the criminal result, according to the nature of the offence; and
The legality, admissibility, and reliability of the evidence relied upon by the prosecution.
If the prosecution evidence fails to establish an essential element required for conviction, the presumption of innocence remains intact.
Fourth: The Accused Is Not Required to Prove His Innocence
The foregoing principle gives rise to another rule of considerable practical importance: weakness in the defence case cannot cure deficiencies in the prosecution’s evidence.
Even where the accused remains silent, produces no defence evidence, or is unable to substantiate the version of events upon which his defence is based, such circumstances do not, by themselves, establish the charge against him.
The first question must always be:
Has the Public Prosecution produced sufficient and lawful evidence establishing the charge?
The question is not:
Has the accused succeeded in proving his innocence?
This distinction reflects the fundamental difference between the legal rule and its exception. Innocence is presumed; guilt must be proven.
Accordingly, an accused person’s inability to prove a particular account of events cannot, standing alone, be converted into affirmative evidence that he committed the offence.
Fifth: Criminal Convictions Must Be Based on Certainty
One of the most important principles associated with the presumption of innocence is that a judgment of conviction should not be based upon mere probability, speculation, or conjecture.
Criminal convictions carry serious consequences for an individual’s liberty, reputation, and legal status. A conviction must therefore rest upon evidence capable of leading the court to a firm judicial conviction that the offence occurred and that it is attributable to the accused.
Accordingly, criminal jurisprudence has consistently recognised the principle that:
Judgments of conviction must be based upon certainty and firm judicial conviction, not upon doubt, suspicion, conjecture, or speculation.
It is not sufficient for the prosecution’s version of events merely to be “possible” or “probable.” Rather, the evidence must be sufficient to establish the level of judicial conviction required for a criminal conviction.
Where the circumstances remain subject to reasonable doubt, that doubt operates in favor of the accused because the constitutional presumption from which the proceedings began remains undisturbed.
Sixth: Doubt Must Be Interpreted in Favor of the Accused
The principle that “doubt must be interpreted in favor of the accused” is not separate from the presumption of innocence; it is one of its most important consequences.
If innocence is the legal starting point, and the prosecution evidence fails to move the court from that starting point to the degree of judicial certainty required for conviction, any remaining doubt must operate in favour of the accused.
This is sometimes expressed in criminal jurisprudence by the proposition:
Innocence is the established legal presumption, and certainty cannot be displaced by doubt.
Where the evidence reasonably admits of two interpretations—one consistent with guilt and another consistent with innocence—and the Public Prosecution has failed to eliminate the doubt through lawful and persuasive evidence, the presumption of innocence remains in force.
In this context, the well-known legal proposition is often invoked:
“Where probability enters the evidence, its probative inference is undermined.”
This proposition must, however, be properly understood. It does not mean that any purely theoretical or remote possibility automatically destroys the probative value of evidence. Rather, a genuine and reasonable possibility affecting the conclusion sought to be drawn from the evidence may prevent that evidence from supporting a conviction founded upon the requisite degree of certainty.
Seventh: The Criminal Judge’s Personal Conviction Is Not Arbitrary
Article 147(2) of the Jordanian Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the criminal judge to adjudicate according to his personal conviction.
Personal judicial conviction, however, does not mean an unrestricted power to convict without evidentiary foundation.
Judicial conviction must be formed based on lawful evidence presented in the proceedings, and the conclusions drawn from such evidence must be reasonable, logical, and legally sustainable.
In forming that conviction, the judge may assess and weigh the evidence, compare witness testimony, accept testimony in which the court has confidence, and reject testimony that it does not find credible, subject to the applicable rules governing criminal evidence.
The ultimate conclusion, however, remains governed by one fundamental rule:
There can be no conviction without persuasive evidence.
The judge’s freedom to assess evidence does not relieve the Public Prosecution of its obligation to produce evidence in the first place.
Eighth: Freedom of Proof in Criminal Proceedings and Its Limits
Article 147(2) provides that evidence in felonies, misdemeanors, and contraventions may be established by all means of proof.
This reflects the principle of freedom of proof in criminal matters.
Such freedom, however, is not absolute.
Article 147(3) expressly provides:
“Where the law prescribes a particular method of proof, that method must be observed.”
Accordingly, although the criminal judge enjoys broad discretion in evaluating evidence, the court remains bound by legal rules governing the admissibility and lawfulness of evidence and by any specific evidentiary method prescribed by the legislator in particular circumstances.
The presumption of innocence therefore cannot be rebutted by evidence of any nature whatsoever.
It must be rebutted by evidence upon which the court may lawfully rely.
Ninth: What Happens When the Public Prosecution Fails to Produce Sufficient Evidence?
Article 147(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a clear answer:
“Where no evidence is established in respect of the alleged fact, the judge shall acquit the accused, defendant, or complainant against whom the offence has been alleged.”
The significance of this provision lies in the fact that it transforms the presumption of innocence from an abstract legal principle into a mandatory judicial consequence where the evidence is lacking.
If the criminal act itself has not been established, or if its attribution to the accused has not been proven by the required evidence, there is no lawful basis upon which the court may convict.
Deficiencies in the prosecution’s evidence cannot be cured through assumptions, speculation, or by requiring the accused to prove the contrary.
Tenth: The Position of the Jordanian Court of Cassation on the Presumption of Innocence
Jordanian jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the presumption of innocence and the principle that doubt must operate in favour of the accused.
An important judicial application can be found in Jordanian Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, Decision No. 456/2006, dated 11 May 2006, as published by the Adaleh legal database. The principle established by the Court may be expressed as follows:
“An accused person is presumed innocent until conclusive evidence and proof establishing guilt are available. Where the prosecution evidence is based upon doubt and probability, a decision declaring the accused innocent of the offences charged is consistent with the law.”
This judicial approach clearly demonstrates the relationship between three complementary principles:
Presumption of innocence → burden of proof on the Public Prosecution → doubt operates in favor of the accused.
It is therefore insufficient for the Public Prosecution merely to raise suspicion concerning the accused. It must produce evidence capable of enabling the court to move from the original presumption of innocence to a finding of criminal responsibility.
Eleventh: It Is Not Enough to Prove That a Crime Occurred; It Must Also Be Attributed to the Accused
An important distinction must be drawn between proving that a crime occurred and proving that the accused before the court committed that crime.
A court may be fully satisfied that a particular offence was committed, yet the evidence may still be insufficient to establish that the person standing trial was its perpetrator.
In such circumstances, the court may not move from proof of the existence of the offence to an assumption that the accused is responsible for it.
The Public Prosecution must therefore establish two separate but complementary matters:
First: that the offence occurred and that all of its legal elements were satisfied.
Second: that the commission of the offence is attributable specifically to the accused.
The seriousness of the offence, or even the certainty that it occurred, cannot compensate for a deficiency in the evidence linking the accused to its commission.
Twelfth: Confession and the Presumption of Innocence
Even a confession by the accused must be considered within the broader framework of fair-trial guarantees.
A fundamental principle of criminal justice is that no person should be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. Any confession upon which the prosecution seeks to rely must satisfy the conditions imposed by law.
The presumption of innocence is therefore closely connected with the right to remain silent, the prohibition of coercion, the right to defense, and the right to legal representation.
The objective of criminal proceedings is not to secure a conviction by any means available, but rather to ascertain the truth through lawful, fair, and legitimate procedures.
Thirteenth: The Presumption of Innocence and Fair-Trial Guarantees
The principle that an accused person is innocent until proven guilty cannot be separated from the broader framework of the right to a fair trial.
The presumption of innocence would lose much of its practical meaning if an accused person were unable to understand the charge against him, challenge the prosecution evidence, present his defense, obtain legal representation, or exercise the avenues of appeal provided by law.
The principal safeguards associated with this principle include:
The right to be clearly informed of the charge;
Adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense;
The right to defend oneself and to obtain legal representation;
The right to examine and challenge prosecution witnesses;
The right to call witnesses and present exculpatory evidence;
Protection against compelled confession or self-incrimination;
Respect for personal integrity and privacy; and
The right to exercise the avenues of appeal prescribed by law.
The presumption of innocence is therefore not merely a rule of evidence.
It constitutes an essential component of the philosophy and structure of a fair criminal trial.
Fourteenth: The Danger of Conviction Based on Mere Suspicion
There is a fundamental distinction between suspicion and evidence.
Circumstances surrounding an accused person may give rise to suspicion, and certain indications may justify an investigation where the legal requirements for doing so are satisfied.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that such circumstances are sufficient to support a conviction.
Suspicion may justify the commencement of an investigation in accordance with the law, whereas a judgment of conviction requires a substantially higher evidentiary threshold and degree of judicial conviction.
This distinction illustrates the importance of the presumption of innocence: it prevents suspicion from automatically becoming guilt.
A criminal trial is not a process in which an accused person must find a way to prove his innocence from suspicion.
It is a judicial process in which the prosecuting authority bears the burden of proving its allegations.
Fifteenth: May an Accused Person Be Convicted Merely Because His Defense Is Unconvincing?
As a general rule, the court’s rejection of the accused’s defense does not automatically establish the prosecution’s case.
This is one of the most precise and important consequences of the presumption of innocence.
A court may reject a particular defense advanced by the accused, but it must still ask:
Does the prosecution evidence, standing on its own, suffice to establish guilt?
A conviction does not arise merely because the defense version has failed.
It arises only where sufficient lawful evidence establishes the charge.
In other words:
The accused’s failure to prove his version of events does not relieve the Public Prosecution of its obligation to prove its case.
Sixteenth: Acquittal and Insufficiency of Evidence
In practice, a question may arise concerning the meaning of an acquittal.
Some may assume that an acquittal necessarily means that the court has affirmatively established that the accused did not commit the act.
That understanding is not always legally accurate.
The presumption of innocence means that guilt must be proven.
Accordingly, where the prosecution evidence fails to reach the legal threshold required for conviction, the original presumption of innocence remains intact and the legal consequence prescribed for failure of proof must follow.
An acquittal is therefore not a concession granted to the accused.
It is the consequence of the prosecution’s failure to displace the legal presumption of innocence.
Seventeenth: “It Is Better for a Guilty Person to Escape Punishment Than for an Innocent Person to Be Wrongfully Convicted”
The widely recognized legal maxim that:
“It is better for a guilty person to escape punishment than for an innocent person to be wrongfully convicted.”
Reflects a fundamental philosophy of criminal justice.
The criminal justice system possesses extensive powers over the individual, ranging from arrest and detention to trial and the imposition of custodial and other criminal penalties.
A wrongful conviction is therefore not an ordinary judicial error. It may result in the deprivation of an innocent person’s liberty, damage to his reputation, and severe consequences for his personal life, family, and future.
The presumption of innocence accordingly operates as a barrier between mere accusation and judicial conviction.
The quality of criminal justice is not measured by the number of convictions obtained, but by its ability to punish those whose guilt has been established in accordance with the law while protecting innocent persons from wrongful conviction.
Eighteenth: The Presumption of Innocence Does Not Protect Criminality; It Protects Justice
It is sometimes mistakenly assumed that strong procedural safeguards for accused persons, or the application of the principle that doubt operates in their favor, protects offenders from accountability.
The presumption of innocence does not prevent the conviction of a guilty person.
It requires only that guilt be established by evidence and in accordance with law.
At the same time, it protects society itself. Society’s interests are not served merely by obtaining convictions; they are served when those convictions are based upon fair procedures, reliable evidence, and sound judicial reasoning.
Justice is not achieved by convicting a person merely because strong suspicion surrounds him.
It is achieved by establishing his criminal responsibility according to the standards prescribed by law.
Nineteenth: Practical Application of the Presumption of Innocence Before Criminal Courts
When applying the principle that “an accused person is innocent until proven guilty” to a criminal case, the case file should be analyzed according to a logical sequence.
The defense should first identify the legal elements of the offence charged.
It should then examine the evidence produced by the Public Prosecution in support of each element. Thereafter, the legality, admissibility, reliability, probative force, and consistency of that evidence should be assessed.
The decisive question must then be asked:
Does the evidence, taken as a whole, establish the offence and its attribution to the accused to the degree required to sustain a criminal conviction?
Where the prosecution evidence is contradictory, where a material piece of evidence is affected by a genuine and reasonable possibility inconsistent with guilt, where the link between the accused and the criminal act is missing, where an essential element of the offence has not been established, or where the evidence is otherwise insufficient to attribute the act to the accused, the presumption of innocence remains intact.
The essence of the defense may therefore be formulated as follows:
The Public Prosecution has failed to rebut the presumption of innocence constitutionally and legally guaranteed to the accused and has failed to produce sufficient lawful evidence establishing the elements of the offence and attributing its commission to him to the degree necessary to justify a conviction. Since criminal convictions must be founded upon certainty and firm judicial conviction, and since doubt must operate in favor of the accused, the legal consequence of the failure of proof is an acquittal in accordance with the law.
Twentieth: The Difference Between Judicial Discretion in Assessing Evidence and a Presumption of Guilt
A distinction must be maintained between the principle of the criminal judge’s personal conviction and any purported exemption of the prosecution from its burden of proof.
The judge may select and rely upon the evidence he finds persuasive, but there must first be lawful evidence before the court capable of forming the basis of such conviction.
Likewise, the court’s authority to assess witness testimony does not permit a conviction to be founded upon assumptions or speculation.
Two principles therefore operate together:
The judge enjoys discretion in assessing evidence, while the accused enjoys the presumption of innocence.
The balance between these principles is achieved when the court exercises its authority to evaluate the evidence but proceeds to conviction only where the lawful evidence before it establishes the offence and its attribution to the accused to the degree required by law.
Conclusion
The principle that “an accused person is innocent until proven guilty by a final judgment” is neither a legal slogan nor merely a phrase appearing in criminal judgments.
It is one of the most important constitutional guarantees upon which the Jordanian criminal justice system is founded.
The Jordanian Constitution enshrines this principle in Article 101(4), while Article 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives it practical effect through rules governing criminal evidence, the burden of proof, judicial assessment of evidence, and acquittal where the evidence fails to establish the alleged facts.
The fundamental consequence is that an accused person is not required to prove his innocence because innocence is the legal presumption.
Rather, the Public Prosecution bears the burden of proving the contrary.
A criminal conviction should not be found upon mere suspicion, probability, or speculation. It must rest upon lawful evidence capable of producing the degree of judicial conviction required to establish both the commission of the offence and its attribution to the accused.
Accordingly, any genuine and reasonable doubt remaining after a full examination of the evidence must operate in favor of the accused because the presumption of innocence cannot be displaced by mere probability.
Ultimately, the strength of a criminal justice system is not measured by its ability to produce the greatest number of convictions.
It is measured by its ability to achieve a more exacting balance:
No person should be punished unless his criminal responsibility has been established in accordance with the law, and no innocent person should be convicted merely based on suspicion.
That is the essence of the presumption of innocence, the essence of a fair criminal trial, and the fundamental guarantee that the Jordanian constitutional legislator sought to protect when it expressly declared:
“An accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty by a final judgment.”
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